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In the last twenty years, aircraft maintenance outsourcing has
driven strong growth in the third-party Maintenance Repair and
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Overhaul (MRO) facility industry. In the United States, deficien-
cies in safety oversight and regulation have played a role in some
maintenance-related incidents. Since then, Congress wrote legis-
lation to require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
improve its safety oversight, particularly of offshore facilities.
However, there has been no such pressure driving improvement
in Australia. Questions have been raised about the poor prac-
tices in some offshore MRO facilities and about the safety over-
sight of offshored maintenance. This article argues that the
existing system, based on International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) standards, cannot provide certainty that the planes
of Australian-registered airlines are maintained to best practice
standards. This is for two reasons: the regulations have gaps and
enforcement of the regulations leaves much to be desired.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE USE OF THIRD-PARTY Maintenance Repair and Over-haul (MRO) facilities has grown over the last twenty years
based on the outsourcing of aircraft maintenance that was previ-
ously undertaken by airlines in-house.1 Such outsourcing has oc-
curred particularly with heavy maintenance “D checks,” which
occur every six years or so on conventional airliners and involve
taking the aircraft apart for inspection and overhaul, often re-
painting.2 Concerns about the safety implications, particularly
when the outsourcing of D checks involve offshore work, arose
in the United States following some maintenance-related inci-
dents in which deficiencies in safety oversight played a key role.3
Since then, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
been forced to improve its safety oversight of offshore facilities.4
1 RACHEL TANG & BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42876, OFFSHORING OF
AIRLINE MAINTENANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC JOBS AND AVIATION SAFETY 4
(2012).
2 Michelle Northcutt, Comment, General Aviation Accident Rate: How General
Aviation Differs from Commercial Airline Flight and How to Correct the Discrepancy, 78 J.
AIR L. & COM. 381, 405 (2013).
3 Michael Quinlan et al., Outsourcing and Offshoring Aircraft Maintenance in the
US: Implications for Safety, 57 SAFETY SCI. 283, 283–86 (2013) [hereinafter Quinlan
et al., Outsourcing and Offshoring]; Kendal Van Wagner, Comment, Cutting Costs
and Cutting Corners—The Safety Risks Associated with Outsourcing Aircraft Maintenance
and the Need for Effective Safety Oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration, 72 J.
AIR L. & COM. 631, 641–43, 647–49, 652–54 (2007).
4 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AV-2015-066, FAA
HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED REPAIR STATION OVERSIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2015), https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20oversight%
20of%20foreign%20repair%20stations.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH98-DBK8];
2016] OFFSHORE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 227
Questions were raised about the safety oversight of offshored
maintenance in Australia as well, beginning in 2007.5 In 2014, a
major government Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR)
questioned the effectiveness of domestic safety oversight.6 This
inquiry, however, did not address the safety oversight of off-
shored maintenance; indeed, it barely mentioned maintenance
at all.7 Airline representatives dismissed these concerns as mis-
conceived because Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) inspected and approved offshore MRO facilities.8
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations,
expressed through national legislative frameworks, define the
terms on which these approvals are issued.9 This article argues,
first, that the ICAO regulations lack clarity, which undermines
accountability for the safety oversight of offshored maintenance.
Second, it argues that there are deficiencies in the CASA inspec-
tion and safety oversight regime. It observes that there have
been instances of unsafe practices offshore that justify regula-
tory oversight. And, finally, it argues that the existing regulatory
arrangements do not encourage confidence in the Australian
government’s ability to exercise its duty of care for the safety of
those who fly in Australian-registered planes.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly
surveys the United States’ debate over the safety of maintenance
performed offshore. The third section surveys the debate in Aus-
Michael Quinlan et al., Slow to Learn: Regulatory Oversight of the Safety of Outsourced
Aircraft Maintenance in the USA, 12 POL’Y & PRAC. IN HEALTH & SAFETY 71, 72–73
(2014) [hereinafter Quinlan et al., Slow to Learn].
5 See Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association, Submission No 35 to
Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Educa-
tion, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Workforce Challenges in the Transport Indus-




6 Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, Aviation Safety Regula-




8 Matt O’Sullivan, Union Dossier—Engines Found ‘Not Secured’ After Offshore Main-
tenance, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/busi-
ness/aviation/union-dossier-claims-qantas-engines-not-secure-after-offshore-main
tenance-20140314-34scl [https://perma.cc/8TSF-K8NB].
9 See generally Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Safety Oversight Manual, ICAO Doc. 9734-
AN/959 (2d ed. 2006), http://www.icao.int/WACAF/AFIRAN08_Doc/9734_par
ta_cons_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UDF-6QDK].
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tralia and presents some evidence of poor maintenance prac-
tices in offshore facilities. Section four explains the regulatory
system that is based on ratification of the Chicago Convention,
which we argue cannot provide the necessary degree of certainty
as to the safety of offshore maintenance. Section five returns to
the debate about utilizing offshore maintenance facilities for
Australian airlines. It presents an argument that a much
stronger role should be played by Australia’s regulator in polic-
ing maintenance in the offshore MRO facilities in which Austra-
lia maintains its planes. The ASRR argued that aviation
regulation should be based on an approach similar to the Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Treaty of the Cold War: “trust and verify.”10
We argue CASA’s existing approach trusts too much and verifies
too little.
This article draws from research of the safety oversight of off-
shore maintenance as part of a broader Australian Research
Council-funded project.11 The project is titled The Future of Air-
craft Maintenance in Australia: Workforce Capability, Aviation Safety
and Industry Development.12 The specific research goal of this sub-
project was to assess the safety, reliability, and quality issues
raised by offshore maintenance.13 To this end, we undertook an
extensive desk review of the regulatory literature, including the
ICAO Convention and its Articles and Annexes, the Australian
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs), as well as literature
on the aviation maintenance industry, including media docu-
mentaries.14 We examined statistical evidence of aviation safety
in general and with regard to outsourcing and offshore mainte-
nance in particular.15 We conducted more than forty interviews
10 Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 1, 59. The phrase “trust and
verify” comes from a reference to policing adherence to arms control treaties
during the Cold War: “doveryai no proveryai,” ironically, was a Russian proverb
used by President Reagan, meaning “trust but verify.” That is, to be sure people
are playing by the rules, you have to inspect. Id.
11 See IAN HAMPSON, DOUG FRASER, MICHAEL QUINLAN, ANNE JUNOR & SARAH
GREGSON, THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE IN AUSTRALIA: WORKFORCE CA-
PABILITY, AVIATION SAFETY AND INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT (2015) [hereinafter HAMP-
SON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE], https://www.business.unsw
.edu.au/research-site/industrialrelationsresearchcentre-site/Documents/Fu-
tureAircraftMaintenanceReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY7V-PZB9]. This is the
Final Report of Findings from Australian Research Council Linkage Project
110100335. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1.
14 Id. at 218.
15 Id.
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and focus groups with “industry and regulatory experts, current
and former CASA officials, training managers, employers, union
officials[,] and license holders.”16 We surveyed workers in the
aircraft maintenance industry, predominantly licensed and unli-
censed engineers, and more than half of 708 respondents, about
380, wrote responses to a final open-ended question inviting
comment on any issue of concern or interest for which about
170 of those responses spontaneously raised safety concerns.17
II. OFFSHORE MAINTENANCE AND SAFETY
A. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
Following airline deregulation in the United States beginning
in 1978, substantial restructuring took place in the airline indus-
try, including the growth of low cost carriers and the outsourc-
ing and offshoring of maintenance.18 A number of high profile
incidents followed, including the loss of ValuJet Flight 597 in
June 1995.19 The explosive growth in heavy aircraft maintenance
that moved offshore from the United States arguably exceeded
the capacities of the regulatory regime. Maintenance took place
in locations where the FAA lacked oversight resources, specifi-
cally in uncertificated shops.20 According to a report by the Of-
fice of the Inspector General (OIG) in the U.S. Department of
Transportation, there were as many as 1,400 of these uncertifi-
cated maintenance and repair shops in 2005.21
Much debate took place in the media and eventually found its
way into academic literature. For example, a Public Broadcast
Service (PBS) Frontline documentary drew attention to mainte-
nance practices in poorly regulated MRO facilities—signifi-
cantly, not all of them offshore.22 This documentary alleged
such practices as “pencil-whipping,” which is when an inspector
16 Id.
17 Id. at 111; Sarah Gregson et al., Supply Chains, Maintenance and Safety in the
Australian Airline Industry, 57, J. INDUS. REL. 604, 610–12 (2015).
18 See Quinlan et al., Outsourcing and Offshoring, supra note 3, at 291.
19 Id. at 287–88.
20 Van Wagner, supra note 3, at 634–37.
21 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AV-2006-031, AIR
CARRIERS’ USE OF NON-CERTIFICATED REPAIR FACILITIES 6 (2005), https://www
.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/av2006031.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK6G-
RAM4].
22 Frontline: Flying Cheaper, PBS (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/flying-cheaper/ [https://perma.cc/63LE-3R4N].
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signs off and thereby fasely asserts that a maintenance process
has been completed, that all parts were approved, and that only
properly trained and licensed employees were used; in reality
the maintenance process is not complete, unapproved parts
were used, and untrained and unlicensed personnel have been
employed, including illegal immigrants with poor linguistic
competence.23 This does not qualify as academic research be-
cause the methods used by the PBS investigators to gain infor-
mation would not likely meet the approval of Research Ethics
Committees.24 However, the investigators must resort to such
methods because few MRO facilities open their doors to the me-
dia or academic researchers.25 There seems to be, unfortunately,
a climate of secrecy around the aircraft maintenance industry.26
The academic debate polarized between one researcher who
pointed to dangers in maintenance being outsourced and
moved offshore,27 another researcher who repeated the widely
held view that “jet travel has consistently become safer decade by
decade,”28 and a final researcher who opined that there was no
evidence that outsourcing and offshoring had decreased
safety.29 On the other hand, another researcher, a supporter of
the relatively new “human resource management (HRM) in the
aviation industry” literature, did not address the issue at all.30
An unarguably more authoritative assessment comes from the
2014 International Air Transport Association (IATA) safety re-
23 Id.
24 Background, EUR. NETWORK OF RES. ETHICS COMMITTEES, http://www.eurec
net.org/background [https://perma.cc/8KVL-UP6G].
25 Catherine Rentz, “The Making of This Report,” Frontline: Flying Cheaper, PBS
(Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flying-cheaper/re-
porters-notebook/ [https://perma.cc/QUB7-CUNM].
26 Interview by PBS with Peggy Gilligan, Assoc. Adm’r for Aviation Safety, Fed.
Aviation Admin. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
flying-cheaper/interviews/peggy-gilligan.html [https://perma.cc/9X7M-
DUNA].
27 Van Wagner, supra note 3, at 631–33.
28 Arnold Barnett, Aviation Safety and Security, in THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY
313, 319 (Peter Belobaba et al., eds., 2009).
29 Kari L. Monaghan, Examining the Relationship Between Passenger Airline
Aircraft Maintenance Outsourcing and Aircraft Safety 96–97 (Jan. 24, 2011) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Northcentral University) (on file with SMU
Dedman School of Law).
30 Ian Hampson et al., Missing in Action: Aircraft Maintenance and the Recent
‘HRM in the Airlines’ Literature, 23 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 2561, 2561
(2012) [hereinafter Hampson et al., Missing in Action] (citing GREG BAMBER ET
AL., UP IN THE AIR: HOW AIRLINES CAN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE BY ENGAGING
THEIR EMPLOYEES (2009)).
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port, which identifies maintenance as a factor in ten percent of
accidents worldwide and around nine percent of fatal acci-
dents.31 In particular, the most expensive and fatal single air-
craft crash was, after a full investigation, unambiguously
attributed to faulty maintenance.32 In 1985, pilots of a Japan Air
Lines Boeing 747 lost control of the plane when the rear bulk-
head blew out, which was caused by a faulty repair job on tail-
strike damage from 1978.33 This illustrates that the
consequences of poor maintenance can lie dormant for many
years. Another example is a defective repair job on tailstrike
damage on a then-new Air China Boeing 747 in 1980. Twenty-
two years later, on May 25, 2002, the repair gave way and re-
sulted in total loss of the aircraft.34 These cases make the point
that poor quality maintenance can lead to catastrophic safety
outcomes, sometimes a long time after the maintenance took
place.
Much of the debate in the United States has taken place in
academic, professional, or industry-specific areas, and the les-
sons learned are not readily transferable to aviation.35 There is a
growing body of work that links outsourcing and offshoring to
catastrophic outcomes, both for occupational health and safety
and for public safety.36 This literature identifies several risk fac-
tors—economic and financial pressures, disorganization of the
workplace through poor management practices, spill-over ef-
fects like eroded working conditions, and “non-compliance and
poor regulatory oversight,” known as regulatory failure.37
31 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
63–65; see INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASS’N, SAFETY REPORT 2014, at 30–31 (2015),
http://www.iata.org/publications/Documents/iata-safety-report-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HKH-9G8U].
32 See ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747SR-46 JA8119, AVIATION SAFETY NETWORK,
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19850812-1 [https://perma
.cc/HBU5-H3XC].
33 Id. A tailstrike occurs when a plane lands at too steep an angle and its tail
contacts the ground before the wheels. Tail Strike Avoidance, AERO, no. 4, 1998,
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_04/textonly/tr01txt
.html [https://perma.cc/MDN5-MNX9].
34 ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-209B B-18255, AVIATION SAFETY NETWORK,
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20020525-0 [https://perma
.cc/FPY2-SLZZ].
35 Quinlan et al., Outsourcing and Offshoring, supra note 3, at 284–86.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 285; see Quinlan et al., Slow to Learn, supra note 4, at 84; see also HAMP-
SON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at 72–75.
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Two agencies to which the FAA is accountable—the OIG and
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)—pursued the
issue of the inadequate oversight of uncertificated third-party
MRO shops to which American airlines were sending an increas-
ing amount of heavy maintenance.38 The FAA’s inclination was
to leave the responsibility with the carriers.39 Only pressure from
the above agencies, as well as from Congress itself, prevailed in
requiring that FAA regulate for all “covered” maintenance work
to be performed by certificated repair stations by 2015; establish
a safety assessment system for all repair stations; and inspect the
stations annually to maintain their certifications.40 Subsequently,
the FAA announced new rules requiring all airlines to “develop
policies and procedures for contract maintenance acceptable to
the FAA, include [the FAA] in [the airlines’] maintenance
manuals, provide the FAA with a list of all persons contracted to
undertake maintenance, and maintain surveillance of contract
maintenance providers to ensure they complied with the car-
rier’s maintenance program.”41
B. AGENCY AND INFORMATION PROBLEMS
Regulatory oversight is particularly important when the prin-
cipal-agent problem inherent in the contract relationship gives
rise to suspect practices. This problem typically exists where an
agent is contracted by a principal to perform a task and where
the two parties’ interests and knowledge are asymmetrical.42 By
moving to contract maintenance, the aircraft operator gives up
control over the planes, and the maintenance provider may lack
accountability that would exist if the provider flew the plane and
was directly responsible for the welfare of crew and passengers.
In an arm’s length relationship between aircraft operation and
aircraft maintenance, accountability can fall through the
cracks.43
38 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
99.
39 Id. at 100.
40 Id. at 100–01; see FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-95, § 308, 126 Stat. 11, 62 (2012).
41 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
101.
42 Id. at 80; see generally Kathleen M. Eisenstadt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and
Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989)).
43 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
80.
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Under the former model where maintenance was performed
in-house, air operators made decisions about which mainte-
nance operations were to be performed and how. Now, whether
the third-party contractor is onshore or offshore, “decisions are
increasingly shaped . . . through the mechanism of a contract
where, by definition, the interests of the two parties do not al-
ways coincide.”44 When the interests differ, the agency problem
arises, particularly under a “compliance approach” when the
contracted provider performs only in the way that is precisely set
out in the contract.45
The compliance approach is a particular hazard when a con-
tract specifies that work must be completed within a particular
timeframe. Heavy penalties may apply if the work is not com-
pleted on time. Also, problems arise if unexpected maintenance
issues require extra work and extra time that is beyond the
scope of the contract. New or different work may require rene-
gotiating contracts or lengthening the time the plane is out of
service. In some circumstances, the vendor may abide strictly by
the contract obligations and ignore the extra work to avoid con-
tractual issues.46
Alternatively, the vendor may be pencil-whipping the addi-
tional work required, rather than actually performing the work,
or may be performing the work too quickly. One example is cov-
ering up corrosion with filler and paint rather than removing it.
The vendors do this not because they are unconcerned with the
public’s safety, but because they must meet a deadline, which is
the primary contractual obligation.47
The contract maintenance [workers do] exactly what’s in the
contract. If [they]’re going in there to just do a certain task and
it’s not an inspection, irrespective of what damage is around
there, they do the task and close it up because that’s the
contract.48
An alternative risk is that either party, or both parties, to the
contract may be incentivized to bury a defect. If the operator
feels real pressure to return the plane to service, he has the op-
portunity and incentive to ignore a defect and quickly return




47 Id. at 80–81.
48 Id.
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there are no other waiting contracts to be performed, the ven-
dor has the opportunity and incentive to classify minor imper-
fections as defects to create more work. Industry informants
prove that this occasionally occurs:
The contract was written at a fixed price for routine work, but all
work arising was charged extra, so the MRO workers would
spend more time on those jobs as they made more money, the
majority of these were minor cabin appearance issues, not airwor-
thiness issues.49
Another risk comes from the loss of the “whole-of-plane” ap-
proach to maintenance, which is when the maintenance pro-
vider examines the repair in relation to the remainder of the
workings of the aircraft. The vendor’s responsibility allegedly be-
gins and ends with the contract specifications, so there is a feel-
ing that there is no responsibility once the work is done to check
the repair in conjunction with the functioning of the remainder
of the aircraft. If the aircraft operator did the work, the entire
airplane would be verified. The problem may be compounded if
the plane is destined for sale or is leased by the air operator.50
The IATA argued in its 2014 Safety Report that outsourcing
was a risk factor and reported that “very few MRO [facilities] are
capable of completing a large work package . . . to a high stan-
dard under normal time pressures. MRO certification is not a
guarantee of work quality.”51 IATA also noted the existence of
“some anecdotal cases where the primary concern was that the
paperwork for a work package was not done, when in reality the
work itself had not been completed.”52
III. THE AUSTRALIAN DEBATE
The FAA is subject to much greater political oversight than is
Australia’s CASA, which only reports to Senate Estimates Com-
mittees, the Auditor-General, and the occasional Senate inquiry,
and it has largely, until quite recently, escaped political direc-
tion.53 By international standards, Australian airlines have been
slower to utilize offshore maintenance as a competitive strategy.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 81–82.
51 Id. at 75; see INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASS’N, supra note 31, at 78.
52 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
75; see INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASS’N, supra note 31, at 78.
53 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
99.
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They have, however, regularly offshored overflow maintenance,
which is when several planes’ maintenance needs coincide and
exceed available capacity. Thus, when Qantas sought to increase
its rate of offshore maintenance in the 2000s (the result of inter-
nal restructuring to cut costs), a regulatory and supervisory ap-
paratus was there to enable it. This included a mechanism for
CASA to approve offshore MRO facilities and for teams of ex-
perienced Qantas inspectors and licensed aircraft maintenance
engineers (LAMEs), pronounced “lay-mees,” to accompany the
planes to ensure quality.54
Offshore maintenance was politicized in 2007 when the Aus-
tralian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association (ALAEA) ar-
gued in a Senate inquiry that, despite the labor cost advantages
to the company, offshoring was a drain on the national economy
in terms of lost jobs, revenue, workforce capability, and safety.55
The ALAEA submission raised a number of concerns, including:
the ratio of licensed to unlicensed inspectors in overseas MRO
facilities; the violation of occupational health and safety during
component cleaning; and the alleged use of prison labor, which
was strenuously denied by Qantas.56 Through the next two years,
as if on cue, Qantas suffered a number of mechanical issues that
were arguably traceable to poor quality maintenance, and there-
fore linked to poor safety oversight of offshored maintenance.
Some of these found their way into the media, and debates
about the safety of offshored maintenance became embroiled in
a number of industrial relations issues and processes, which are
not the concern here.57
A. SOME EVIDENCE OF QUALITY PROBLEMS
IN OFFSHORE MAINTENANCE
Some evidence of unsafe maintenance practice exists,58 sup-
plemented by further evidence drawn from interviews with
maintenance managers and inspectors, many of them LAMEs,
who were participants in the first wave of Qantas offshoring
from the mid-2000s. Lately, this source of evidence has disap-
peared, and there is no way of knowing whether the problems
54 Id. at 22, 99–102.
55 ALAEA Submission 2007, supra note 5.
56 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
85–86; Hampson et al., Missing in Action, supra note 30, at 2570–72.
57 Hampson et al., Missing in Action, supra note 30, at 2565–66.
58 Gregson et al., supra note 17, at 607–13.
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described have recurred.59 However, the fact that they existed at
all indicates that safety oversight of offshore maintenance re-
quires special attention, specifically oversight of certain hazards
of which the following is one example.
1. The Introduction of Scribelines
Scribelines are small scratches made in the aircraft hull as a
result of using inappropriate tools to remove paint or sealant
from the hull surface, panel joints, or around external fittings.
Approved tools that will not scratch metal are far less efficient
for paint removal than prohibited tools, such as paint scrapers,
screwdrivers, pocket-knives, or angle-grinders—all tools that re-
portedly have been used in offshore facilities. With repeated cy-
cles of pressurisation and depressurisation, the seemingly trivial
and inconspicuous scratches develop into cracks and tears,
which can eventually cause aircraft disintegration.60
According to an Airworthiness Notice (AWN) from the Malay-
sian Department of Civil Aviation, scribeline damage concerns
can be traced back to a 1988 incident in which an American-
registered Boeing 727 “experienced cabin decompression after
the fuselage skin peeled off from its stringers” as the result of
scribelines that were “introduced during the aircraft
maintenance.”61
It is obvious that such “scribe mark” scratches, if not repaired,
will initiate fatigue cracks and result[ ] in widespread multi-site
fatigue damage (MSD), which would result in rapid decompres-
sion and loss of aircraft in flight.62
The AWN explicitly required MRO facilities to avoid generat-
ing scribelines using unapproved tools, following new Boeing re-
quirements for extra care with scribelines that were
incorporated in changes to structural repair manuals. However,
Australian inspectors supervising maintenance shortly, only a
couple of years, after the AWN was issued “continued to find
instances of unsafe sealant removal practices.” But a diligent
59 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
81.
60 Id. at 83.
61 Id.; DEP’T OF CIVIL AVIATION OF MALAYSIA, AIRWORTHINESS NOTICE NO. 91, at
1 (2005) [hereinafter AIRWORTHINESS NOTICE NO. 91], http://www.dca.gov.my/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AN91.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA7U-7HYH].
62 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
83; see AIRWORTHINESS NOTICE NO. 91, supra note 61.
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manager committed to safety “found the poor quality work and
demanded it be redone to [meet the appropriate] standard.”63
They were just walking around with knives cutting sealant off skin
panels, leaving these . . . quite heavy scribelines in some cases[,]
and when we were finding these and bringing it to their atten-
tion[,] they were in that case definitely just hiding the de-
fects. . . . [T]hey were told to rework it in accordance with the
SRM (Structural Repair Manual) and then allow us to inspect it
. . .
I returned the next day, . . . [and] the sealant was on and the
paint was already applied. I said, [“]well, hold on a [second]
guys, I asked for us to inspect this.[”] [They replied, “]Oh no,
that was going to take too long because we did this on the night
shift and you were going to hold us up[.”] and I said[, “]well, I
don’t care, take it off[.”] and it started a whole hoo-hah. . . . I had
to sit down with the managers [and] sign . . . a customer agree-
ment form basically that said I agree to the extra man-hours re-
quired to remove this and we’ll pay the bill and everything else.
So I insisted they pull it off, [and] when I pulled it off, the scribe-
lines hadn’t been repaired.64
2. The Issues with Scribelines Continue
In another example, inspectors had to uncover the cause of
decompression on one of two Boeing 747s that an Australian
airline purchased from another airline. The two planes became
known as the “Ugly Sisters” because they were plagued with
faults. The cause of the decompression was a long, vertical,
around-the-body crack in the frame, which was the consequence
of using prohibited tools in paint removal. The scribeline, which
looked like a pencil line, had been covered with sealant that had
lifted from the frame when pressure had been exerted from
within the fuselage, and it could not have been seen without
prior experience.65
B. OTHER MORE RECENT EVIDENCE OF POOR
MAINTENANCE PRACTICES
ALAEA claimed, in an inquiry submission, that a D check on a
Boeing 747 in Hong Kong revealed a number of engine mount-
ing bolts had been installed upside down. A witness represent-
63 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
83.
64 Id. at 83–84.
65 Id. at 84.
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ing CASA at the inquiry hearings claimed that “the problem was
a trivial one and affected only one bolt on one engine.” But this
upside down bolt violated procedure, at the very least, on one of
the most heavily stressed parts of an aircraft, and it raised con-
cern that the regulator had a relaxed approach to this safety
breach.66
One reason for such departures from safety standards is an
extreme undersupply of qualified and licensed supervisory per-
sonnel. A desirable ratio of supervision in Australia is 1:3, with
one LAME supervising the work of three unlicensed inspectors.
In Europe, the average ratio is estimated at 1:5. The “most likely
scenario” used by the ICAO in its labor requirement forecasts,
based on representative observed practice across all member na-
tions, sets the ratio for a large passenger or cargo jet at 1:3. How-
ever, ALAEA claims that the ratio in a Singaporean MRO
facility, to which Qantas planes were sent for heavy maintenance
in early 2000s, was 1:11. In Hong Kong, the ratio was 1:8 and in
the Philippines, the ratio was 1:22.67
Language barriers often increase supervision and oversight
problems, according to one former maintenance inspector. He
reported that one LAME would oversee twenty or more unli-
censed inspectors, some of whom did not know English at all.68
Some former inspectors suggest that there is a systemic link
between safety outcomes and national differences in regulatory
requirements. One maintenance inspector remarked that:
If we were seeing a lot of unusual defects or defects that were
unusually severe in their extent[,] we would go back and look at
the previous check[,] and nearly always the previous check
would’ve been done at a foreign MRO.
I’ve actually worked on the [de-identified] aircraft in our mainte-
nance facilities before. We used to do some of their engine main-
tenance and we found some rather unnerving things. We found
drills broken off inside fuselage [pins] and a rivet head had basi-
cally been cut from the rivet and glued over the top of the rivet
hole. . . . So [we] X-rayed the panel and we found a drill bit stuck
inside the fuselage. . . . [O]nce again whether that was done by
[de-identified] Airlines[,] maintenance itself, or whether it was
done by an MRO that they used, obviously we can’t find that
out.69
66 Id. at 85.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (alteration in original).
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It is clear that inadequate maintenance practices have oc-
curred, which makes a strong case that all MRO facilities should
be subject to strong and effective safety oversight to counter the
negative effects. How effective is the current international sys-
tem at providing that oversight?
IV. THE UNCERTAIN REGULATION OF OFFSHORE
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
An environment in which an ever-growing proportion of
maintenance occurs outside the state of registration is imposing
new strains on the international regulations meant to ensure
safety. It has exposed lack of clarity in the regulations, and the
ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP),
which is supposed to reinforce the international system, has lost
much of its previous functionality, specifically that it no longer
performs regular audits of national regulators. Other standards-
setting and monitoring processes have arisen, such as those op-
erated by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the
IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), and the FAA’s Interna-
tional Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASAP), but these
are beyond the scope of this article. In any case, both IASAP and
IOSA are based on ICAO standards, and Australia is committed
by treaty and its own legislation to employ regulatory oversight
processes based on the ICAO system.70
A. LACK OF CLARITY IN ICAO REGULATIONS
There are 191 members to the Chicago Convention (the Con-
vention), which set up the ICAO as an arm of the United Na-
tions. The ICAO sets the standards for regulation of the
international aviation system, which guide national legislative
and regulatory practice.71 There are tensions between the Con-
vention’s various Articles and Annexes, which produce lack of
clarity and comprehensiveness in safety regulation. The regula-
tions specify that the safety of maintenance is the responsibility
of the state of registry, but it allows for such responsibly to be
offshored to contracting states.72
70 Id. at 91–99.
71 About Us, U.S. MISSION TO THE INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://icao.usmis
sion.gov/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/R4D7-85EW]; see Paul Stephen
Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism, 41 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 649, 661 (2003).
72 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
91–95.
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For example, Article 31 and Annex 8 insist that the state of
registry has overall responsibility for the safety of its planes. An-
nex 8 requires that the state of registry have an ongoing inspec-
tion regime that should not be delegated to another state.
The State of Registry also has the responsibility to make certain
that every aircraft on its register is maintained in an airworthy
condition throughout its operational service life. . . . Although
methods of discharging the foregoing State airworthiness respon-
sibilities may vary, and in some cases, may involve the transfer of
certain tasks to authori[z]ed organi[z]ations or other States, such
arrangements do not relieve the State of Registry from its overall
responsibility.73
On the other hand, Article 33 encourages contracting states
arrangements, which require mutual recognition between states
provided their practices “are equal to or above the minimum stan-
dards [that] may be established from time to time pursuant to
this Convention.”74 This means that a certificate of airworthiness
issued in another state, where the offshore maintenance oc-
curred, must be rendered valid by the state of registry. This is
true despite difficulties of verification posed by sovereignty,
under the assumption that the offshore maintenance state fol-
lows standards that are equal to or above the minimum stan-
dards.75 Article 33 not only allows, but arguably requires
reciprocal recognition arrangements that transfer certain func-
tions of a national regulator to other countries, including safety
oversight.76 This is a significant regulatory inconsistency; it
makes the state of registry responsible for safety oversight with-
out giving it the means of discharging that responsibility.
The mechanisms by which ICAO standards are monitored
and verified are crucial to the working of the system. The issue,
however, is that the Convention allows ICAO to notify con-
tracting states of violations of the guidelines of the Convention
but does not provide authority for safety compliance and en-
forcement. The effectiveness of the Convention in ensuring
73 Id. at 93 (alteration in original); see Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion art. 31, annex 8, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention].
74 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
93 (quoting Chicago Convention, supra note 73, art. 33 (emphasis added)).
75 Id.
76 Id.
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safety in aviation “is based on the assumption that each con-
tracting State adheres to the organi[z]ation’s safety standards.”77
B. VERIFYING INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE: THE UNIVERSAL
SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAM
Article 38 imposes an obligation on member states to declare
differences if they do not comply with ICAO standards.78 Non-
compliance created a major safety concern in the mid-1990s be-
cause some states that were not observing standards were also
not filing differences. Thus, ICAO established the USOAP in
1998.79 The goal of the program was as follows:
Determine States’ capabilit[ies] for safety oversight by assessing
the effective implementation of the critical elements of a safety
oversight system and the status of States’ implementation[s] of
safety-relevant ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, as-
sociated procedures, guidance material[,] and safety-related
practices.80
Typically, ICAO officials conduct USOAP audits after signing
a Memorandum of Understanding between ICAO and the au-
dited state. This process confirms the principle of sovereignty
despite the compulsion or pressure states feel to accept the au-
dits. Certain states pushed against ICAO’s “policing” of their
safety systems.81 However, one author argues that a nation
state’s obligations to enforce safety oversight in its territory
should be viewed as obligations to all, which justifies the role of
a centralized international institution like ICAO as the en-
forcer.82 Others argue for decentralization of enforcement, in
which states act against a noncompliant state, despite no direct
connection. Article 33 supports this argument in that it allows
for noncompliant state certificates to be refused recognition by
77 Id. at 94; see Jiefang Huang, Aviation Safety, ICAO and Obligations Erga
Omnes, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 63, 66 (2009); Olga Barreto, Safety Oversight: Federal
Aviation Administration, International Civil Aviation Organization, and Central Ameri-
can Aviation Safety Agency, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 651, 654 (2002).
78 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
94.
79 Id.
80 Id.; see Chicago Convention, supra note 73, art. 33.
81 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
94.
82 Id.; see Huang, supra note 77, at 71–72.
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other contracting states. The FAA regulatory system follows this
practice, as well as the EASA regulatory system.83
USOAP is crucial to the workings of the system because it
helps verify if states’ safety regulations comply with ICAO stan-
dards. The first round of safety audits, beginning in 2000, were
used to verify that regulators implemented the Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in Annexes 1, 6,
and 8.84 By 2006, ICAO reported that nation states had made
significant progress in implementing state corrective action
plans and including key elements of a safety oversight system.
Transparency concerns continued, however, because only gen-
eral disclosures were available on the ICAO website, rather than
the broad publications that were promised.85
The initial series of audits ended around 2009, and there were
concerns about their relative infrequency. USOAP was then up-
graded to the Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA), which
gathers information on an ongoing basis and does not include
the infrequent audits. But the upgrade was not without its faults,
one of which being that CMA relies partly on self-reporting by
the regulators being audited.86 The extent to which Australia
has implemented the CMA is not known at the time of writing
this article.
There is no doubt that the ICAO programs have limitations,
but they have also identified “fundamental weaknesses in the
safety programs of many States, resulting in significant differ-
ences in safety standards around the globe.”87 In the 2013 Safety
Report, ICAO found that the percentage of compliance in im-
plementing the “critical elements” of safety oversight was sixty-
one percent across all nations audited, while the percentage for
airworthiness oversight was somewhat higher at seventy-three
83 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
94; see Michael Jennison, The Future of Aviation Safety Regulation: New US-EU Agree-
ment Harmonizes and Consolidates the Transatlantic Regime, But What is the Potential for
Genuine Regulatory Reform?, 38 AIR & SPACE L. 333, 334–35 (2013).
84 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
94.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 94–95; see The USOAP Evolved: Realizing the Promise of the Continuous
Monitoring Approach, 65 ICAO J., no. 5, 2010, at 1, 25–26; Evolving ICAO’s Universal
Safety Oversight Audit Programme: The Continuous Monitoring Approach, 65 ICAO J.,
no. 4, 2010, at 1, 24.
87 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
95.
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percent, which is still not entirely encouraging.88 The significant
differences that ICAO identified have not led to an adjustment
in the default rule to treat all national licenses and certificates as
equivalent.89
To sum up, the international regulatory scheme is one in
which the international body has no substantive powers to act
on its own initiative for violations of its standards; the enforce-
ability of the scheme depends on the willingness of individual
nations to apply sanctions; the provisions can be overridden by
bilateral or multilateral agreements between individual member
countries; and, most seriously, there is a regulatory inconsis-
tency between Articles 33 and 31 and Annex 8 of the Conven-
tion.90 Therefore, confidence in the international regulatory
system of aircraft maintenance safety oversight—at least insofar
as it is based on the ICAO system—is misplaced.
V. UNCERTAINTY IN AUSTRALIAN SAFETY OVERSIGHT
OF OFFSHORE MAINTENANCE
Reference was made above regarding concerns that standards
could decline during the gaps between USOAP audits.91 This is
relevant to Australia, which was last audited in 200892 at the be-
ginning of major aircraft maintenance regulation reforms
aimed at harmonizing the regulations with the EASA regulatory
system. The resulting program following reform, called the Reg-
ulatory Reform Program (RRP), strained relations between the
regulator and the industry leaders.93 The government’s ASRR
found that the transition process was having a “negative impact
on effective safety oversight.”94 In particular, the capacity of
88 Id.; see INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., 2013 SAFETY REPORT 7–8 (2015), http://
www.icao.int/safety/documents/icao_2013-safety-report_final.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/FXN4-P338].
89 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
95.
90 See id. at 92–95.
91 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
92 See INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., FINAL REPORT ON THE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AU-
DIT OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SYSTEM OF AUSTRALIA (2008) [hereinafter 2008 AUSTRA-
LIA AUDIT REPORT], http://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ICAO
_USOAP_Final_Report2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFQ2-9K4Y].
93 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
109–13.
94 Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 91. The ASRR reported on
domestic, not international, regulatory oversight because it astoundingly re-
garded the latter as beyond the purview of its review of safety regulation. Id.
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CASA’s inspectors to perform their roles has been called into
question.95 We consider these points in turn.
CASA has previously issued a number of approvals to overseas
MRO facilities, under Australian law, consistent with Article 31
and Annex 8 of the Convention. These offshore authorizations
have increased the burden on Australian oversight because ap-
provals require regular auditing and inspection under Annex 8
of the Convention. In response, the Australian regulator increas-
ingly relies on other countries’ National Airworthiness Authority
(NAA) decisions to provide safety oversight of offshore mainte-
nance of Australian registered planes. This reliance comes from
the creation of Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASAs),
which ultimately treat domestic and overseas spaces as identical
for regulatory purposes.96
A. AMBIGUOUS AUSTRALIAN SAFETY OVERSIGHT
The ambiguities described above are reproduced within Aus-
tralian legislation, regulation, and practice. Australia’s Civil Avi-
ation Act of 1998 (the Act) states:
CASA shall perform its functions in a manner consistent with the
obligations of Australia under [the Convention] and any other
agreement between Australia and any other country or countries
relating to the safety of air navigation.97
Australia’s State Safety Program (SSP) supports the Act and
holds CASA “responsible for the safety regulation of both civil
air operations in Australian territory and Australian aircraft op-
erating outside Australian territory.”98 According to CASA’s un-
derstanding, the Act grants authority to CASA to maintain air
safety.
[The Act] places responsibility on CASA to conduct the safety
regulation of civil air operations in Australian territory[,] and the
operation of Australian aircraft outside Australian territory, by
means that include “developing effective enforcement strategies
to secure compliance with aviation safety standards.”99
The means of enforcement may include automatic accept-
ance of other countries’ standards and approvals, which is con-
95 Id. at 88.
96 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
97–98.
97 Id. at 96 (quoting Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) s 11 (Austl.)).
98 Id. (quoting Australia’s State Aviation Safety Program 2012 (Cth) s 1.2 (Austl.)).
99 Id.
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sistent with Article 33 of the Convention, as explained above.
The practice of automatic acceptance has a history. With respect
to licensing, CASA has, under Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR)
1988 Division 5, historically treated approvals given by an ICAO
contracting state as being, to all intents and purposes,
equivalent to those in Australia. The relevant regulation is as
follows:
(1) The holder of the certificate of registration for an Australian
aircraft on which maintenance has been carried out outside Aus-
tralian territory must not fly the aircraft, and must ensure the
aircraft is not flown, if each of the following requirements is not
satisfied:
(a) the completion of the maintenance has been certified
by:
(i) a person who would have been permitted by regula-
tion 42ZC to carry out the maintenance if the aircraft
had been in Australia; or
(ii) if the maintenance was carried out in a Contracting
State – a person who would be permitted under the law
of the Contracting State to certify the completion of the
maintenance if the aircraft were registered in the Con-
tracting State[.]100
Under this regulation, the final provision effectively makes
Australian aircraft maintenance quality “hostage to the training,
licensing[,] and approval processes of another country.”101 No-
tably, this regulation does not apply to the Regular Public Trans-
port (RPT) sector. Regulation of RPT was done under CAR30
but now is in transition to the new EASA-based regulations, spe-
cially Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 1998.102
The introduction of Part 42 of CASR establishes that a registered
operator is responsible for the continuing airworthiness of an air-
craft used for [RPT] as described under CAR 206(1)(c). Fur-
ther[,] Part 42 of the CASR has set up legislative requirements
under clause 42.295 of Subpart 42 D - Maintenance [that] states
that all aircraft involved in RPT Operations must be maintained
by a Maintenance Organi[z]ation that is approved by CASA
under Part 145 of CASR.
All offshore maintenance work for aircraft conducting RPT oper-
ations is governed under the requirements in Parts 42 and 145 of
100 Id. at 96–97 (quoting Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) pt 4A div 6 reg
42ZN (Austl.)).
101 Id. at 97.
102 See id.
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CASR. Any offshore organi[z]ation conducting maintenance
work for an RPT aircraft has to go through an identical [ap-
proval] process as applicable for a domestically located
organi[z]ation.103
Approval of an offshore facility, to be equivalent to a domestic
approval consistent with the requirements of ICAO standards,
must be directly administered by CASA following its own inspec-
tions. This process is distinguishable from ongoing inspections
necessary to ensure retention of approval. Previously, if CASA
found problems, it could withdraw approval from the foreign
shop. However, “mutual recognition” of each other’s regulatory
authorities, consistent with Article 33 and expressed in BASAs,
remove this possibility.104 An example of the scope of these
agreements is the 2013 Technical Agreement (TA) between
Australia and Singapore:
By signing the TA, CASA acknowledges that maintenance or-
gani[z]ations, approved in accordance with [relevant law] and
qualifying under the terms of the TA are considered equivalent
to an Australian [maintenance shop] approved under [CASR
1998] Part 145.105
Through this mutual recognition and the supporting agree-
ments, Australia’s regulator must take the approval of its coun-
terpart organization at face value. This is true even without
personal knowledge of the conditions in the MRO facilities or of
the quality of the subcontractors to which the MRO facilities
might outsource work. There is also no way for the regulator to
track what plane, or part thereof, is being maintained where be-
cause there is no requirement on airlines to inform CASA where
and when Australian airlines’ planes are being maintained. In
the acceptance of an approval granted by an overseas NAA, the
Australian regulator makes assumptions about the supply chain
of the foreign MRO facility. Some assumptions are, for example,
that the facility is secure against the entry of fake parts and that
the approved MRO facility is not outsourcing work to non-ap-
proved MRO facilities.106 Further, some NAAs, Singapore’s spe-
103 Id.
104 Id. at 97–98.
105 Id. at 98.
106 The FAA has a rigorous Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) process, cover-
ing both design and production approval for aircraft replacement parts and mod-
ification items. Bilateral recognition agreements based on PMA approvals can be
extended to the production and installation of items on certain products in other
countries. See Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (May 3,
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cifically, are not only safety regulators, but also are required to
play a role in supporting their country’s aviation sector and their
country’s MRO industry, meaning that they must also be indus-
try policy advocates.107 This makes regulatory capture possible,
and Australia’s ASRR argued that it was not appropriate to com-
bine the roles in this way in Australia.108
B. THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTORATE
An adequately trained and resourced inspectorate using an
appropriate array of enforcement tools is critical to the effective
implementation of safety regulation. There is evidence, both in
aviation and other fields, that changes to work organization,
such as outsourcing, can pose a significant challenge to the in-
spectorate’s capacity to fulfill its role.109 It adds a layer of com-
plexity to their responsibilities for oversight.110 Where work is
moved to another jurisdiction, as by offshoring, it is especially
difficult to maintain adequate regulatory oversight.
The recent ASRR found that Australia’s domestic inspection
regime was flawed in a number of respects.111 Our argument
here is that since the capability of Australia’s inspectorate appar-
ently falls below “international standards” in the domestic
sphere, we would be unwise to rely on its capacity for effective
monitoring of maintenance in the international sphere.
In the early years of maintenance offshoring between 2006
and 2010, Qantas sent its own inspectors to supervise the work
of overseas shops. Some of these Qantas inspectors questioned
the rigor of inspections undertaken by CASA:
2016, 1:30 PM), http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/pma/
[https://perma.cc/B5TZ-8ZV8]. Bilateral recognition agreements may weaken
the line of defense of parts quality, but a more serious issue is the possible intro-
duction of counterfeit and non-approved parts due to insufficient regulation and
monitoring of maintenance subcontracting to non-approved MRO facilities down
the supply chain. Id.
107 Aviation Industry Development, CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE,
http://www.caas.gov.sg/caas/en/About_CAAS/Our_Strategic_Thrusts/Aviation
_Industry_Development/?__locale=en [https://perma.cc/9423-7ZNG].
108 Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 22–23.
109 DAVID WALTERS ET AL., REGULATING WORKPLACE RISKS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF INSPECTION REGIMES IN TIMES OF CHANGE (2011); Quinlan et al., Slow to
Learn, supra note 4, at 72.
110 WALTERS ET AL., supra note 109; Quinlan et al., Slow to Learn, supra note 4, at
72.
111 Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 1–5.
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Well, I mean in all of the times that I was away[,] I only ever saw,
or knew of and essentially didn’t really see[,] CASA at one site
and there apparently were guys there[;] I saw some gentlemen
walking around [but] never spoke to them. They did a general
walk-around and then disappeared[,] and that’s the only time
that I ever saw any input from CASA at any of these MRO
[facilities].112
Now with paper audits, the inspection does not directly reach
the workplace and faults remain that avoid the paper trail of the
company’s safety management system. This displacement of on-
the-ground inspection procedures has been unofficially ac-
knowledged by CASA employees:
We only look at paperwork now. We very rarely actually look at
an aircraft to see if the work [is] done properly. [We o]nly look
at the processes. If the paperwork [is] fine [but] something goes
wrong[,] then you just blame the company.113
CASA inspectors’ absences from the hangar floor may be
partly accounted for by changes in the nature of safety auditing.
According to the ASRR, the verification of maintenance facili-
ties has changed from inspecting actual shop floor processes to
auditing Safety Management Systems (SMS).114
New methods of safety oversight are being introduced for high-
risk sectors. Regulators are having to step back from prescriptive
hands-on inspection processes and apply systems approaches to
safety oversight.115
Yet the SMS concept is almost certain to make CASA’s oversight
task even harder.116
Performance-based rules and the application of SMS, along with
risk-based surveillance concepts, require a change in how safety
agencies work. These changes bring challenges, placing more re-
sponsibility on regulated organi[z]ations and changing how reg-
ulators conduct oversight.117
The ASRR also noted that such inspections were often not
performed under international best practices, or in compliance
112 HAMPSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, supra note 11, at
97–98.
113 Id. at 87.
114 Id. at 105 (citing Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 58).
115 Id. at 105 (quoting Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 58).
116 Id.
117 Id. (quoting Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 57).
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with ICAO standards, because CASA inspectors were not suffi-
ciently well-trained in the techniques.118
[S]ome inspectors lack adequate knowledge and understanding
of the sector they are regulating to ensure correct and consistent
regulatory decisions. Interviews with industry representatives and
CASA staff indicated that adequate audit training is not
provided.119
Thus, the ASRR echoed findings of the ICAO’s report from its
2008 USOAP audit of Australia’s aviation maintenance oversight
system. Australia must upgrade its ability to retain technical ex-
pertise within CASA, and the experience and knowledge of au-
ditors needs upgrading through CASA’s internal training.120
VI. CONCLUSION
The only way to achieve an acceptable degree of certainty in
the safety of maintenance offshored from Australia is to
toughen the inspection regime. CASA must take its verification
task more seriously, the ICAO USOAP process must improve to
underpin a regime of mutual recognition, or a new program
could be formed from yet unconceived international institu-
tions. For now, Australia is, or should be, firmly committed to
the fundamental principle that the state of registry is responsi-
ble for the safety oversight of the aircraft on its national register,
including during and as a consequence of the maintenance of
these aircraft in offshore spaces.
There have been a significant number of problems with main-
tenance quality in offshore facilities. Although planes may not
(yet?) be falling from the sky, the oft-quoted argument used to
brush aside safety concerns, the reassuring statistics cannot and
should not be used to justify a continuing erosion of safety pro-
tections. The absence of an accident does not mean that the
system is “safe.”121 Rather, during a long period without an acci-
dent or serious incident, the greatest enemy of safe practice is
complacency, as layers of safety protection are eroded by cost-
cutting. Safety regulators also prefer the term “compliant” more
118 Id. at 106 (citing Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 78).
119 Id. (quoting Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 78).
120 Id.; see Aviation Safety Regulation Review, supra note 6, at 3–5; 2008 AUSTRALIA
AUDIT REPORT, supra note 92.
121 See Frontline: Flying Cheap, PBS (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/flyingcheap/etc/script.html [https://perma.cc/S8JL-CJDC]
(statement of Miles O’Brien).
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than “safe,” which only means the maintenance is compliant to
the safety management systems that allegedly ensure safety but
do not necessarily do so.
The article’s argument needs to be carefully put because it is
easily, and perhaps conveniently, mistaken for xenophobia, or
worse. That is not intended. Rather, there are serious questions
about the regulation of outsourcing and offshoring mainte-
nance—observations that are entirely consistent with long-stand-
ing research on regulating outsourcing in other industries.
Because offshoring involves another national space, a transna-
tional mechanism is needed, such as a revitalized ICAO USOAP,
to ensure that national regulators do their jobs. If national regu-
lators find it difficult enough to keep up with the oversight of
outsourced maintenance in their own national jurisdictions, it is
difficult to see how they can exercise their responsibilities to en-
sure that planes registered to them are provided with adequate
safety oversight in other countries. Nevertheless, national regu-
lators will find it easier to subject MRO facilities within their na-
tional spaces to the most potent weapon in the inspector’s
arsenal: the surprise inspection.
In the event that the ICAO USOAP is reconstituted and revi-
talized and the regulatory tension between Article 33, Article 31,
and Annex 8 is resolved, the next steps are creating greater
transparency about where maintenance is performed and imple-
menting an improved maintenance rating system, based on as-
sessments by independent public agencies to which airline
customers could refer when choosing the airlines on which they
fly. In that way, if regulation on its own cannot do the job, per-
haps the market, appropriately shaped by regulation and in-
formed choice, will do so.
